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Russian Federation: Executive Branch  
By Susan Cavan 
 
Putin reviews legacy, sets development agenda 
In a speech before an expanded session of the Russian State Council, President 
Vladimir Putin surveyed the accomplishments of his administration and set out a 
list of priorities for the next phase of development through 2020. 
 
As they have been previously, his remarks were notably critical of the political, 
economic, and social chaos of the 1990s.  Without identifying the late President 
Yel'tsin by name, Putin blamed an "ineffective" state for "weakened state 
institutions and disregard for the law.  Russian media outlets often acted in the 
interests of particular corporate groups, carrying out political and economic 
orders.  A large part of the economy was in the hands of oligarchs or openly 
criminal organizations.  Agriculture was in a state of serious crisis.  The country's 
finances were exhausted and we were almost completely dependent of foreign 
borrowing."  … Wealthy Russia had become a land of impoverished people."  (1) 
 
Putin counts among his administration's accomplishments: "ending the war in the 
North Caucasus;" "a clear delimitation of powers between the federal, regional 
and local authorities;" "putting in place a stable and effective political system;" 
"rid[ding] the country of the harmful practice that saw state decisions taken under 
pressure from commodities and financial monopolies, media magnates, foreign 
policy circles and shameless populists;" "restor[ing] the level of social and 
economic development that was lost in the 1990s."   "Finally, Russia has 
returned to the world stage as a strong state, a country that others heed and that 
can stand up for itself."  (2) 
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For all the purported successes of his administration, Putin also pointed out the 
work left to be done.  Some of the goals are familiar themes from presidential 
addresses in many other states: better education, healthcare, and broader 
economic development.  Some of Putin's elucidated reforms are either the direct 
or indirect result of his own policies, such as " the inertia based on energy 
resources and commodities," "excessive centralization," and a "state 
system…weighed down by bureaucracy and corruption."  (3) 
 
While Putin alludes to reforms of the administrative system and of the judiciary 
attempted during his presidential terms, he notes significant work is still to be 
done in these sectors, as well. 
 
Putin also singled out corruption—at all levels of government—as an important 
target for Russia's future development, particularly economic:  "At the moment, 
small businesses work in very difficult conditions.  It is awful what federal bodies 
in the regions, with the support of regional and local authorities do.  … People 
have to give bribes in every controlling institution—fire prevention, environmental 
services, medical permissions—you need to go to all of them, and it's just 
terrible. (4) 
 
In the final press conference of his presidency, 14 February, Putin returned to 
many of the themes mentioned in his address to the State Council.  He also was 
more forthcoming about his political plans in an administration led by President 
Medvedev (assuming Medvedev can out poll his competition). 
 
As for his decision not to seek a third term, Putin explained, "On the very first day 
I told myself that I shall not abuse the Constitution.  I got that vaccination a long 
while ago, while I worked together with Anatoli Sobchak."  (5)  It would be 
interesting to discover not only what incident resulted in Putin's "vaccination," but 
whether or not his siloviki colleagues have been similarly inoculated. 
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As for his support of a Medvedev presidency, Putin commented, "simply I trust 
him." (6)  Given the difficulties inherent in this transition, in any transition from a 
position of such enormous influence, trust would have to be a singularly 
important element.  Putin offered that he believed Medvedev "will be a good 
president and an effective manager," describing him as "an honest, decent and 
progressive person."  (7) 
 
As for the post-election period, Putin remarked:  "The Head of Government has 
enough powers.  There will be no problems with allocating them, I assure you.  
We together with Dmitri Anatolyevich [Medvedev] shall allocate them if the 
electorate permits that."  (8) 
 
Once the distribution of powers between the two highest offices is resolved, there 
will be many other decisions to be made about the work of the state 
administration.  [According to President Putin, the Russian public sector—
including not only the state's administrative bodies, but those supervised by them 
as well—numbers 25 million people.  (9)] 
 
It is clear that the Russian state in the post-election period likely will see 
significant changes both to the distribution of powers between the presidential 
and governmental arms of the executive branch, as well as to the contours of the 
state bureaucracy.  
 
"If voters give credence to Dmitri Anatolyevich Medvedev, if he nominates me for 
prime minister, change will be there – both in the presidential administration and 
in the government," Putin announced.  (10)   Putin continued to describe 
weaknesses in government work as structured during his administration (notably 
by Dmitri Kozak), opening the door for the potential redistribution of authority 
within the executive: "I don't think the structure, formed over the past four years, 
has worked the way some of our colleagues conceived it: the ministries are 
solely busy doing regulatory work, and agencies and others are doing their jobs – 
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all the same, the minister will draw the administrative blanket up to himself."   
Demonstrating that he clearly has given some consideration to the governmental 
division of labor, Putin praised the role of deputy prime ministers, but again left 
the reform door ajar:  "In our system, the institution of deputy prime ministers 
worked effectively.  It showed its worth and, I think, we'll weigh up how we could 
improve the situation and make the government more efficient."  (11) 
 
It has been clear for more than a year that a series of presidential and state 
organizations aimed at fighting corruption are ramping up, and indeed, might 
either have had an effect or simply have mirrored a decision made but not 
announced, in the succession struggle.   During both his State Council address 
and final press conference, Putin acknowledged the pervasiveness of corruption 
in the Russian state and announced that a new law and other measures were 
ready to assist the new administration in dealing with the problem:  "The anti-
corruption law will be adopted.  There is no medicine from corruption.  There 
should be a big legal system, stronger repressive measures and compliance with 
European convention. … Civil servants should be paid decent wages and be 
controlled how they fulfill their duties, [sic] and not be kept on a meager ration."  
Putin added a need to be watchful for corruption among state workers: "We 
never forget them and will take actions in this direction." (12) 
 
A Medvedev presidency is likely to be constructed around many of the same key 
players of past Putin administrations.  It becomes even more likely with the 
knowledge that Putin will not be traveling far from the reins of power in his post-
presidency.   Those government denizens not welcome in a Medvedev 
administration may find themselves ousted by one of the eager anti-corruption 
committees already in place.  There are suggestions already that current anti-
corruption leaders might be given even more prominent roles in the Medvedev 
presidency.  Clearly, this would benefit a figure such as Viktor Cherkesov; it 
might also shed light on his rationale for airing out the siloviki split so publicly in 
Kommersant last October.  (13) 
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In light of the upcoming presidential election, it also seems likely that a 
resignation of the government is in the offing.  It is an open question whether 
Putin or Medvedev would have final word in the personnel lineup of the first 
government of a Medvedev administration.  It would also reveal a lot about the 
real seat of authority in a so-called post-Putin Russia. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) Putin speech at expanded meeting of the State Council on Russia's 
Development Strategy through to 2020, 8 Feb 08  Via 
http://www.kremlin.ru/eng/text/speeches/2008/02/08/ 
1137_type82912type82913_159643.shtml  
(2) Ibid.  
(3) Ibid. 
(4) Ibid. 
(5) "Never felt temptation to seek third presidency-Putin," 14 Feb 08, ITAR-
TASS, 12:41pm EST via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(6) "Putin says supports Medvedev's candidacy for president, trusts him," 14 Feb 
ITAR-TASS, 1:04pm EST via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(7) "Putin says Medvedev will be good president," (Part 2), 14 Feb 08, Interfax 
News Agency; Russia & CIS General Newswire via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(8) "Putin may allocate powers between pres, PM after polls," 14 Feb 08, ITAR-
TASS, 1:26pm EST via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(9) Putin speech at expanded meeting of the State Council, Ibid. 
(10) "Putin: Presidential staff, govt would be reshuffled if Medvedev elected, Part 
2," 14 Feb 08, Interfax News Agency; Russia & CIS Business and Finance 
Newswire via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) "Russia to adopt anti-corruption law – Putin," 14 Feb 08, ITAR-TASS, 
2:55pm EST via Lexis-Nexis Academic. 
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(13) "The collapse of the capo regime," The ISCIP Analyst, Vol. XIV, No.3 18 Oct 
07. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Rose Monacelli 
 
Democracy on the decline in Russia 
If a democracy is represented by “a government in which the supreme power is 
vested in the people and exercised by them directly or indirectly through a 
system of representation usually involving periodically held free elections,” (1) 
what message is Russia sending to the world with its current election process? 
The outcome seemed to have been determined more than a year ago when 
current President Vladimir Putin began to indicate his preference for First Deputy 
Prime Minister Dmitri Medvedev; in the months following, Kremlin officials 
circumvented the democratic process time and again.  First, all outspoken critics 
of the current administration were barred from running in opposition.  Further, 
once the official election began on February 2, utilization of free public airtime 
offered by government-controlled Russian public television overwhelmingly was 
tilted in favor of Medvedev.  Finally, new and intricate restrictions on foreign 
election monitors have made it impossible for outside parties such as the 
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which recently 
announced that, given Russian constraints, it would not send delegates to 
Russia, (2) to keep tabs on the election proceedings.  Opponents of President 
Putin’s United Russia party already have charged Putin with rigging the vote, and 
the absence of Europe's main election monitoring body will cast further doubt on 
the authenticity of the country’s supposed adherence to the democratic process.  
It seems that the next head of the Russian Federation has been chosen already, 
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and the current election is little more than “a performance to convince the world 
that there's a functioning democracy in Russia.” (3) 
 
One way that Russia’s election administration attempts to counter such claims is 
by granting free airtime to each of the few presidential candidates allowed to run 
for airing commercials or televised debates.  (Medvedev, Putin’s candidate, has 
refused participation in debates.) The exact amount of airtime was officially 
divided with a drawing on the Tuesday before the campaign started. In addition, 
each candidate was given seven hours of media airtime during the month of 
February. (4) However, since Putin came to power in 1999, he has quietly 
consolidated many forms of national information dissemination.  Perhaps most 
significantly, nationwide television channels are under state control.  Only one 
independent radio station retains the capability to broadcast nationwide.  The 
circulation of independent newspapers is limited primarily to Moscow and St. 
Petersburg.  Today, United Russia is proving that control of the media is an 
excellent campaign tool.  According to the Center for Journalism in Extreme 
Situations, the state-controlled television stations have ignored virtually all 
candidates except Medvedev.  In addition, almost half of the time allotted to 
domestic political matters during nightly newscasts is filled with overwhelmingly 
positive stories about Medvedev.  Conversely, the other three candidates were 
allocated time for their commercials only between midnight and early morning. 
(5) 
 
Presidential campaigning began in earnest Monday, with candidates sparring in 
televised debates and the broadcast of a series of patriotic television 
commercials. Current projections suggest that Medvedev will win more than 75 
percent of the votes on March 2.  The first public debate between the candidates 
was held on February 4, while Medvedev was heading a Presidential Council 
meeting.  Medvedev’s conspicuous absence was explained by his spokesman in 
a statement that made it clear that the candidate would not partake in traditional 
campaigning or be a part of televised debates with the other candidates, citing 
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his heavy workload of official duties as Deputy Prime Minister in Charge of Social 
Projects.  In the face of domestic and international criticism for Medvedev’s 
seeming unwillingness to discuss his platform or engage in unscripted dialogue 
with his rivals, a spokesman for United Russia explained that it was much more 
important for Medvedev to continue with his regular job doing “real deeds, 
meeting people and solving actual problems, not wrangling in a TV studio.” (6) To 
fulfill this pledge, Medvedev has taken to traveling around Russia with President 
Putin to take part in highly choreographed meetings that are covered extensively 
on state news television networks. 
 
As for the other candidates, when Mikhail Kasianov officially was struck from the 
list of contenders on January 27 for allegedly falsifying over 13 percent of the two 
million signatures needed to place his independent party on the ballot, he called 
on his peers “not to take part in this farce” of an election. (7) Although the 
remaining candidates appear to recognize the discrepancies and essential 
inequality of the current presidential race, the drawbacks have yet to overpower 
the incentives for participating in the farce.  For example, Communist Party 
leader Gennady Zyuganov, who is currently polling at less than 10 percent, has 
raised his national profile by repeatedly threatening to suspend his candidacy on 
the grounds of the essential unfairness of the elections.  Among other 
grievances, he cited the example that his party's monitoring had found that about 
80 percent of airtime devoted to presidential candidates on Russian television 
had been used by United Russia to promote Medvedev. (8) Despite Zyuganov’s 
public proclamation that “we are not that naive to think that these elections will be 
fair,” (9) he announced on February 4 that he would continue his campaign 
because “[he didn’t] want to give the country away to a group of nouveaux 
riches." (10) Zyuganov gives every indication that he hopes to widen political 
discourse in his country, going as far as to compare the level of debate in the 
current Russian election unfavorably to the competition between United States 
Senators Clinton and Obama. (11) At the same time, his continued reluctance to 
leave an “unfair” race is viewed by critics as bolstering the Kremlin claims of 
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political legitimacy and constituting a safeguard allowing for the preservation of 
his own political standing in the face of certain defeat. (12) 
 
Andrei Bogdanov, the leader of the Democratic Party, is an independent 
candidate who inexplicably remains in the race despite current poll numbers at 
less than one percent of the vote. (13) His unorthodox attributes include his age, 
38, which makes him the youngest-ever presidential candidate in Russia, his role 
as the head of the country’s Freemasons, and his optimism about his chances for 
winning the support of younger generations of voters.  On the other hand, 
Bogdanov's party is also widely held to be a Kremlin creation designed to draw 
votes away from genuine democratic opposition candidates and providing voters 
with a non-threatening liberal option.  Like liberal opposition leader Mikhail 
Kasianov, Bogdanov registered without the backing of an official party after 
collecting over two million signatures of supporters.  Unlike Kasianov, who had 
openly and repeatedly criticized President Putin and the current administration, 
Bogdanov was allowed to stay on the ballot, a move that some analysts cite as a 
calculated Kremlin move to prevent further criticism from the West. (14) 
 
At this point in the presidential race, all genuine potential figures of opposition 
have been removed from the political arena through a variety of means, some 
harsher than others.  Aside from Kasianov’s hurdles, supporters of former world 
chess champion Garry Kasparov were not allowed to rent halls for political 
gatherings and signature collection in hopes of earning him a position on the 
ballot.  The opposition rejects these actions and has called for international 
intervention. Zyuganov was recently quoted as saying the election monitors 
"should get off their high horse and at least come to see what is happening here." 
(15) 
 
Unfortunately, another major indicator of Russia’s lack of concern about 
maintaining any semblance of democratic credibility is its unwillingness to work 
with international monitors like the OSCE, the world’s largest regional security 
 10 
organization. The OSCE is comprised of 56 member countries from Europe, 
Central Asia and North America, including Russia, that banded together in “a 
forum for political negotiations and decision-making in the fields of early warning, 
conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation, and puts 
the political will of the participating States into practice through its unique network 
of field missions.”  (16) The Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights 
(ODIHR), a division of the OSCE responsible for election observation and 
democratic development, had attempted to monitor the election process as part 
of its mission to measure each country’s ability to maintain a free and open 
campaign atmosphere and a hold a fair vote on election day.  However, Russia 
not only failed to invite ODIHR observers to take part in a standard planning 
session that would have set the parameters of the monitoring, but, when it finally 
relented and extended an invitation to the ODIHR on 28 January, it did so with 
severe limitations on the size and scope of the mission, as well as its duration, 
(including the mandate that the observers arrive in Russia no earlier than three 
days before the election) plus restrictions on the OSCE’s ability to monitor 
Russian media coverage of the campaign as a baseline for measuring fairness. 
(17) These restrictions were not in effect in past Russian elections, such as in 
2003 when about 400 OSCE observers were on-hand. (18) In announcing the 
pull-out, ODIHR’s Director Ambassador Christian Strohal made it clear that 
ODIHR had outlined “minimal parameters necessary for effective, though limited 
observation in the Russian Federation” and that Russia had rejected their 
attempt at compromise by denying the OSCE advance team’s visa requests. (19) 
 
Recent relations between Moscow and the OSCE have been combative due to 
clashing viewpoints on issues ranging from Kosovo to Chechnya. They have 
worsened proportionately with Russia’s increasingly bold attempts at asserting its 
status as a world power.  The Kremlin recently had indicated that it believed that 
ODIHR was biased against Russia and was acting as a tool of the West in order 
to facilitate access into Russian affairs. (20) 
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Regardless of what happens on March 2, this election has become less about 
choosing, or not choosing, a new President, than a means of proclaiming a major 
shift in domestic policy.  In removing the fundamental right of Russian citizens to 
“seek public office, their right to establish, in full freedom, their own political 
parties, to conduct political campaigning in a fair atmosphere without 
administrative obstacles, and access to the media on a non-discriminatory basis,” 
(21) the Kremlin is enforcing policy that hearkens back to an era where individual 
choice was sacrificed in favor of centralized control.  If "what is true for every 
election is also true for this one - transparency strengthens democracy; politics 
behind closed doors weakens it," (22) then, in the words of former Soviet leader 
Mikhail Gorbachev, who initiated the first inklings of democratization to the USSR 
two decades ago, "Something wrong is going on with our elections, and our 
electoral system needs a major adjustment.” (23) 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “Democracy,” Merriam Webster Dictionary, 9 Feb 08 via http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/Democracy. 
(2) “Russia: OSCE rejects new offer for monitoring presidential poll,” Radio 
FreeEurope / Radio Liberty, 6 Feb 08 via 
http://www.rferl.org/featuresarticle/2008/02/616BBCB3-4359-43CE-B7D8-
75FA10150478.html.  
(3) Fred Weir, “It's Russian election season. So where's the campaign?” The 
Christian Science Monitor, 1 Feb 08 via 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0201/p25s07-woeu.html.  
(4) “Russia to kick off presidential campaign on Saturday,” China View, 30 Jan 08 
via http://www.chinaview.cn/index.htm.  
(5)  “Russian TV overwhelmingly covers Putin's favorite, media watchdog says,” 
PR Inside.com, 7 Feb 08 via http://www.pr-inside.com/print427521.htm.  
(6) Ibid. 
(7) Ibid. 
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(8) Alex Rodriguez, “Monitors abandon effort in Russian election,” The Chicago 
Tribune, 8 Feb 08 via http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/nationworld/chi-
russia_rodriguezfeb08,1,246530.story?ctrack=1&cset=true.  
(9) Ibid.  
(10) “Zyuganov says vote won’t be fair,” The Moscow Times, 5 Feb 08 via 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2008/02/05/014.html.  
(11) Ibid.  
(12) Nabi Abdullaev, “Not your standard presidential candidate,” The Moscow 
Times, 8 Feb 08 via 
http://www.themoscowtimes.com/stories/2008/02/08/003.html.  
(13) Ibid.  
(14) Ibid.  
(15) Ibid.  
(16) “About the OSCE,” The Organization for Security and Cooperation in 
Europe, 8 Feb 08 via http://www.osce.org/about/. 
(17) Ibid.  
(18) VOA News, “OSCE will not monitor Russia's presidential election,” Voice of 
America, 7 Feb 08 via http://www.voanews.com/english/2008-02-07-voa18.cfm. 
(19) Ibid.  
(20) Associated Foreign Press, “Election observers cancel mission to Russia” 
Taipei Times, 9 Feb 08 via 
http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/world/archives/2008/02/09/2003400688. 
(21) Curtis Budden, “OSCE/ODIHR regrets that restrictions force cancellation of 
election observation mission to Russian Federation,” Press Release, ODHIR, 8 
Jan 08 via http://www.osce.org/odihr/item_1_29599.html.  
(22) Ibid.  
(23) Ibid. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Security Services 
By Fabian Adami 
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Threatening Georgia again 
During the last six months, Russia’s border with Georgia has been the focus of 
increased attention from the Russian Security Services. A considerable part of 
the Border Reform Project announced by Deputy Director Vladimir Pronichev in 
the spring of 2005 has been devoted to improving infrastructure, as well as to 
introducing new surveillance equipment such as infrared sensors, radar, and 
television systems. 
 
The physical improvements to the Caucasus section of the Russian border have 
not been carried out in a vacuum. Concurrent with the reform program, Russian 
officials have embarked on what can only be described as a campaign of 
“threatening rhetoric” against Georgia that has continued—and escalated—into 
the present. 
 
In mid-November 2007, during an official visit to North Ossetia for the purpose of 
opening a new Border Guards’ residential complex, FSB Director Nikolai 
Patrushev stated that the “main terror threat” to Russia came from the region. (1) 
These comments were followed in short order by a statement from Lieutenant 
General Nikolai Rybalkin, Deputy Chief of the Border Guards, who claimed that 
the Georgian border would be reinforced, due to the fact that terrorist extremists 
could still cross into Russia “from Georgian territory.” (2) 
 
Rybalkin’s, and Patrushev’s comments, together with the news that the Georgian 
border was to be reinforced had a clear purpose. Georgia experienced 
considerable internal unrest last fall, with the result that a new presidential 
election was called for early January 2008. The motivation for the above 
statements was to demonstrate Russia’s interest in the outcome of the polls. The 
message: elect a Russia-friendly President…or else.  (3) 
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On January 5, Mikhail Saakashvili was reelected President of Georgia. Poll 
results indicated that he had obtained 53.47% of the vote, while his closest rival 
obtained 25.69%. Included in the poll, was a referendum on the question of 
whether Georgia should continue its NATO “application process.” 72.5% of 
Georgia’s electorate apparently supports the idea of membership in the US-led 
alliance. (4) 
 
During the Cold War, NATO—by including Turkey in its membership—was 
encamped on the USSR’s southern flank. If Georgia joins the Atlantic Alliance, 
Russia again will have NATO on its southern doorstep, in the vicinity of vital 
energy sources. As such, the election results cannot have been welcomed in 
Moscow, and this fact was reflected in a new statement emanating from the FSB. 
 
On February 7, Lieutenant General Anatoli Zabrodin, First Deputy Chief of the 
Border Guards, spoke to reporters.  Zabrodin claimed that “gunmen affiliated with 
illegal armed formations” were still in the Pankisi Gorge, and that these rebels 
were “working to elaborate plans to carry out terrorist attacks in the North 
Caucasus Republics.” Zabrodin admitted that the Security Services had no 
“specific information” regarding the rebels’ intentions, (5) but that he could not 
rule out the “possibility” of a breakthrough by the “terrorists” into Russia. (6) 
Ominously, Zabrodin noted that the “entire land border with Georgia” is situated 
“within the zone of action” of the new Border Guards Special Forces unit created 
recently. (7) Zabrodin’s remarks have been labeled as “yet another provocation” 
from Russia by the Georgian government. (8) 
 
If Tbilisi believes that provocative statements are all that Moscow intends, there 
yet may be a rude awakening. Zabrodin’s choice of words – namely that Russia 
as yet does not possess “specific information” on terrorists in the Pankisi Gorge 
is revealing. The question must be asked: what happens when the Russian 
Security Services claims to have developed precise and actionable intelligence? 
It may now be a matter of when, not if, Russia acts in some military way against 
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Georgia proper, and the new Border Guards Spetsnaz units likely will be in the 
forefront of any action. 
 
The surveillance state 
Late in September 2006, Russia’s Interior Minister Rashid Nurgaliyev announced 
that a new law had been drafted that would allow the Security Services to 
register citizens genetically. Nurgaliyev claimed that registration for the DNA 
databank would, in some cases, be mandatory and in other cases voluntary, with 
members of the military, Security Services and certain classes of criminals to be 
included in the former category. The DNA databank is to be supported through a 
network of 34 nationwide laboratories. (9) At the time of writing, it is not clear just 
how developed the DNA system is. 
 
On February 6, the Board of the Interior Ministry held its annual meeting. The 
importance of the session was indicated by the fact that President Vladimir Putin 
attended personally for the first time in two years. (10) Nurgaliyev’s keynote 
address contained an important piece of information: Work has commenced on 
the creation of a nationwide network of CCTV surveillance cameras, which are to 
be used to “eradicate street crime,” as well as to create “safe traffic” areas. (11) 
Some 500 areas of Russia will be placed under video surveillance by July 2008. 
(12) What those areas will be has not been specifically stated—but it is safe to 
assume that large parts of Russia’s major cities, including St. Petersburg and 
Moscow will be covered. 
 
Also on February 6, FORUM/Moscow (a Russian internet watchdog) published 
for informational and debate purposes a new law on internet security that soon 
could be placed before the Duma for consideration. The draft law seeks to 
“regulate the relationship between the state and representatives of the Internet 
Community.” (13) FORUM/Moscow alleges that the law will allow “serious 
surveillance” to be carried out on the internet, and further, that allowing internet 
service providers and organizations to be “self-regulating” in their interactions 
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with government (as the law proposes) is a policy that gives rise to serious 
concerns, because it will allow information on internet users to be passed to 
authorities without proper legal safeguards. Moreover, it will allow domain names 
and websites to be shut down without warrants, with no recourse through the 
courts for their owners and operators. (14) If the law passes the Duma, it will 
come into effect the day it is officially published. 
 
The Russian government already has suborned large segments of both the print 
and televised media. Its citizens are to be logged in a genetic database, and 
large portions of their movements and daily lives watched by “traffic cameras.” 
Now, it is highly likely that their internet habits also will be tracked and logged by 
the Security Services.  Russia is taking a step beyond being merely a security 
state: apparently now it is to become a sophisticated and fully-fledged 
surveillance state. 
 
Defector publishes memoirs 
In October 2000, Sergei Tretyakov, a Colonel in Russia’s Foreign Intelligence 
Service (SVR), defected to the United States. At the time of his defection, 
Tretyakov was working as the Deputy Rezident at the United Nations, although 
he was apparently “undeclared” and working under diplomatic cover. (15) 
 
Late in January, almost eight years after his defection, Tretyakov, together with 
Washington Post journalist Pete Earley, published a memoir called “Comrade J.: 
The Untold Secrets of Russia's Master Spy in America after the End of the Cold 
War.” According to the book, Tretyakov was resettled under a new name by the 
CIA and received one of the largest financial packages ever paid to a defector. 
(16) 
 
Excerpts of Tretyakov’s book reveal his reasons for defection. Tretyakov believes 
that in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, Russia had been “repeatedly raped 
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and looted by its leadership,” while President Putin’s leadership of the country 
was and is “immoral.” (17) 
 
Press reviews indicate that the book has problems. Not least, because Tretyakov 
makes claims that seem outlandish, such as the allegation that former Deputy 
Secretary of State Strobe Talbot was “a valuable intelligence source” for Russia, 
because the SVR managed to “trick and manipulate him.” (18) 
 
Even if the book does contain somewhat dubious claims, Tretyakov has real 
words of warning for those who believe Russia’s international actions are entirely 
benevolent. He insists that the USA is still considered the “main target” of 
Russian intelligence services and that those intelligence services are doing 
everything they can to “embarrass the US.” It is “naïve,” in Tretyakov’s view, to 
believe that the Cold War ended Russia’s ambitions in the international arena. 
(19) 
 
Concerns have been raised over Tretyakov’s safety – especially in light of the 
Litvinenko assassination. Tretyakov himself believes that it is not “in the interests 
of the Russian government” (20) to come after him. Given that his specialty was 
foreign, not domestic intelligence, and that therefore his knowledge of FSB 
behavior inside Russia probably was limited, this assumption may be correct, but 
it is likely that his CIA handlers are taking no chances with his security. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “FSB Chief Inaugurates New Border Complex in Dagestan,” RGVK TV, 
Makhachkala, in Russian, 14 Nov 07; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(2) “Militants Could Break Through The Russian Border From Georgia,” 
Agentstvo voyennykh novostey, 29 Nov 07: OSC Transcribed Text via World 
News Connection. 
(3) See The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIV, Number 6 (17 Dec 07) 
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(4) See Caucasus Section of The ISCIP Analyst, Volume XIV, Number 7 (31 
January 08). 
(5) “Reports on Gunmen in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge ‘Provocation,’—Official,” 
Kavkaz Press, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 8 Feb 08; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(6) “Russian General Says There Are Still Rebels in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge,” 
Interfax News Agency, Moscow, in Russian, 7 Feb 08; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-
Nexis.  
(7) “Reports on Gunmen in Georgia’s Pankisi Gorge ‘Provocation,’—Official,” 
Kavkaz Press, Tbilisi, in Georgian, 8 Feb 08; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(8) Ibid 
(9) “Russian Police Working on Nationwide DNA Database,” ITAR-TASS, 25 Sep 
06; BBC Monitoring via Lexis-Nexis.  
(10) “Putin Takes Part in Meeting of Top Interior Ministry Officials,” ITAR-TASS, 6 
Feb 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(11) Ibid. 
(12) “Over 500 Video Controlled Areas To Be Created in Russia by 1 July 2008,” 
ITAR-TASS, 6 Feb 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(13) “Russian Website Editor Calls Draft Model Law on Internet ‘Frightening.’ 
Report by Oleg Kazakov: ‘New Draft Law on Internet—People Watch Out,” 
FORUM/Moscow/Russia www-Text,  6 Feb 08; OSC Translated Text via World 
News Connection. 
(14) Ibid.  
(15) “Russian Spy Agency Brands Defector’s Remarks As ‘Traitor’s’”, ITAR-
TASS, 28 January 08; OSC Transcribed Text via World News Connection. 
(16) “Senior Russian Spy Reveals Secrets in New Book,” Reuters, 25 Jan 08 via 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22842463/  
(17) “SVR Colonel Sergei Tretyakov In His Own Words,” The Center For 
Counterintelligence And Security Studies via 
www.cicentre.com/Documents/sergei_tretyakov.html  
(18) “They Had Robert Hanssen. We Had Sergei Tretyakov,” The Washington 
Post, 27 Jan 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
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Counterintelligence And Security Studies via 
www.cicentre.com/Documents/sergei_tretyakov.html. 
(20) “Senior Russian Spy Reveals Secrets in New Book,” Reuters, 25 Jan 08 via 
www.msnbc.msn.com/id/22842463/. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By Lt. Col. Carol Northrup 
 
GLONASS woes 
Precision-Guided Munitions (PGM) increasingly are considered crucial to military 
superiority in twenty-first century warfare.  The extreme accuracy of these 
coordinate-seeking weapons and the reliability with which they hit their intended 
targets puts them on par with nuclear weapons as a force multiplier.  When 
Russian President Vladimir Putin laid out his “grandiose” plan last October for 
upgrading Russia’s armed forces, he stressed the importance of “high-accuracy 
armaments” to Russia’s national security.  
 
A PGM’s accuracy comes from the very precise coordinates provided by a 
constellation of navigational satellites.  Russian PGMs rely on the Global 
Navigation Satellite System (GLONASS) to provide these coordinates.  Last 
March, President Putin singled out global positioning as a field in which he 
expected Russia to surpass the US (1) and charged Deputy First Prime Minister 
Sergei Ivanov with ensuring that GLONASS was fully operational by the end of 
2007. (2)  However, Ivanov announced earlier this month that GLONASS is 
deficient and that he has been unable to carry out Putin’s wishes. 
 
On 23 January, Ivanov announced that devices on the satellites have not 
reached the required reliability level, the satellite cluster does not provide 100% 
coverage throughout Russia and the constellation does not meet modern 
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requirements for precision weapons employment.  (3)  When the Russian military 
successfully launched a Proton-M rocket with three GLONASS satellites on 
Christmas Day, Russian government reports proclaimed it now had a system on 
par with the US GPS constellation. (4)  Less than a month later, Russian Space 
Troops Commander Colonel General Vladimir Popovkin said at a press 
conference that the quality of the parts used to build GLONASS satellites is of 
“major concern” and that the system fails to provide coverage for the entire 
territory of Russia. (5)  Popovkin explained that Russia uses foreign-made 
hardware to make the satellites, but cannot buy high-quality US components due 
to fears that they may be sabotaged by secret “insertions.” (6)  
 
The first GLONASS satellites were launched in 1982 in response to the 
launching of the first US GPS satellites.  GLONASS officially was declared 
operational in 1993 and reached the planned complement of 24 satellites in 
1996.  (7)  However, by 2002 the system had deteriorated so badly that only 
eight satellites were operational. (8)  Despite renewed emphasis since 2004, 
GLONASS still has only 13 functional satellites, (9) which severely hampers the 
system’s ability to triangulate a precise coordinate.  GLONASS is estimated to 
cover 50-60% of the earth’s surface and to provide accuracy within 17 meters.  
By contrast, the US GPS system has 30 satellites in orbit enabling it to provide 
geo-positioning at any point on the globe with approximately one meter accuracy.  
While GPS can be used by Russia for civilian navigation, it cannot be used for 
military purposes such as missile launches or targeting PGM. 
 
Russia plans to continue launching GLONASS satellites; another six satellites 
are scheduled to be added in 2008 and plans call for 24 total by 2010. (10)  In 
2009, the first two improved GLONASS-K satellites are set to be launched, (11) 
and Popovkin has called for reform of the space industry and creation of a 
special space corporation. (12)  Even so, it appears that once again the Kremlin’s 
reach has exceeded its grasp.  Even if all goes as planned, a truly operational 
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Russian global navigation system and the attendant military capabilities are still 
years away. 
 
Another step toward US missile defense in Europe 
On 1 February, Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski announced that his 
country has reached agreement in principle with the US on plans to install 
components of a missile defense system in Poland.   The announcement dashes 
any hope Russia had that the Trusk government would derail Washington’s 
missile defense plan. (13) When the US announced plans early last year to install 
a missile defense system in Europe, then Prime Minister Jaroslaw Kaczynski 
strongly supported the presence of anti-missile systems in Poland.  However, his 
successor, Donald Trusk, argued for increased security concessions from 
Washington to counter threats from Russia in exchange for Poland’s support.  
(14) 
 
Trusk seems to have been successful.  Details have not been released, but in a 
joint appearance US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Polish Foreign 
Minister Radoslaw Sikorski both suggested that the US would help with Polish air 
defenses. (15)  Sikorski and Rice sought to address Russia’s concerns about US 
aid by repeating that the reinforced defenses are not directed at any state in 
particular (presumably other than Iran), but are simply meant to make Poland a 
stronger NATO ally. (16) 
 
The Kremlin is not buying it.  The announcement has generated sharp criticism 
from Russia, which once again has voiced strong opposition to what it claims is 
an attempt by Washington to encircle it. (17)  Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov said that it’s clear that the US missile defense system is concentrating 
around Russia’s borders, and that Russia views it as a manifestation of US 
imperial thinking. (18)  President Putin said Russia will be forced to take 
retaliatory steps and accused the US of stonewalling Russia and ignoring its 
security concerns regarding the sites. (19)  
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The topic will be a key item on the agenda for talks between Trusk and Putin on 
8 February.  “The issue has not yet been put to rest,” said a Putin aide, “this is a 
decision that is not being made for Poland’s own sake but against Russia.” (20)  
In an interview with Interfax-AVN, Sikorski stressed that negotiations are not 
complete, and assured Russians that Poland would continue to discuss the issue 
with Russia.  Sikorski also stressed that Poland will make security decisions 
independently of Russia and other interested parties. (21)  “Russia is one of the 
few states in the world that shouldn’t fear other countries” Sikorski said. (22) 
 
Russia has opposed US missile defense plans aggressively since they were 
announced, but to no avail.  Suspension of CFE, threats to target Poland with 
Iskander intermediate range missiles, promises of “asymmetric” response and 
warnings of a renewed arms race have yielded no concessions for Moscow.  
Poland however, seems to have benefited nicely. 
 
Source Notes: 
(1) “GLONASS Should be Cheaper, Better than GPS,” RIA Novosti, 12 Mar 07 
via Lexis-Nexis. 
(2) “Putin Says GLONASS Should Cover Russia by Year End,” TASS, 29 Mar 
07, via Lexis-Nexis. 
 (3) “First Deputy PM Ivanov Slams Agency Over GLONASS Failings,” RIA 
Novosti, 23 Jan 08 via http://en.rian.ru/russia/20080123/97581422.html. 
 (4) “Did GLONASS Failure Sink Ivanov’s Chance at the Presidency?” Eurasia 
Daily Monitor, 6 Feb 08 via 
http://www.jamestown.org/edm/article.php?article_id=2372780.  
 (5) “Reasons Why Global Navigation System GLONASS Lags Behind GPS,” 
Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, 5 Feb 08, via World News Connection. 
 (6) Ibid. 
 (7) Space Today Web Site accessed 6 Feb 08, via 
http://www.spacetoday.org/Satellites/GLONASS.html.  
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Daily Monitor, 6 Feb 08 via 
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 (13) “Poland Agrees to Host US Shield,” The Moscow Times, 4 Feb via 
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via Lexis-Nexis. 
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 (16) Ibid. 
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TASS, 8 Feb 08 via World News Connection. 
 (18) Ibid. 
 (19) “Russia has adequate response to new arms race challenges – Putin,” BBC 
Monitoring (Rossiya TV, Moscow, in Russian), 8 Feb 08 via Lexis-Nexis. 
 (20) “Putin, Polish PM To Raise U.S. Missile Defenses Issue,” 
Agentstvo voyennykh novostey (Internet Version-WWW), 8 Feb 08 via World 
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 The thoughts and opinions expressed in this article are those of the author and 
do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United States Air Force, 
Department of Defense, or the United States government. 
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Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Jeremy Weiss 
 
Setback in Serbia, continuing Estonian resentment  
The re-election of Boris Tadic as President of Serbia on February 3 marked a 
defeat for Russian interests in the Balkans. The EU-oriented Tadic edged out his 
pro-Russian opponent Tomislav Nicolic by a narrow margin, (1) in a development 
that has several negative consequences for Russian foreign policy. Throughout 
the campaign, the two candidates differed strongly in their approach to Serbia’s 
relations with the European Union. Nicolic, an ardent nationalist, pledged to turn 
away from the EU and toward Russia in response to the EU’s support for 
Kosovar independence, even going so far as to promise that he would allow a 
Russian military presence on Serbian soil, should he ascend to office. (2) This 
appeal to friendship with Russia failed to secure a victory for Nicolic, suggesting 
that Russia’s influence in the Balkan state may not be as strong as Russophile 
Serbs had hoped. The winning candidate indicated his willingness to oppose 
Russia’s aims in Serbia by criticizing the recent purchase of Serbia’s state 
natural gas monopoly by Gazprom. More importantly, Tadic has stated that 
although he opposes independence for Kosovo, he will not allow the matter to 
interfere with Serbia’s accession to the European Union. (3) EU officials, 
including Javier Solana, expressed their enthusiasm for Tadic’s victory, and 
scheduled the signing of an accord later in the week which would ease visa 
restrictions and promote trade between Serbia and the European Union. (4) 
However, ongoing disputes within Serbia over the Kosovo issue forced the EU to 
postpone the accord meeting, which had been slated for the week following the 
election. (5) 
 
Despite this setback, President Tadic’s determination to lead his country to EU 
membership remains a significant challenge to Russia’s goal of expanding its 
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role in the Balkans. Should Tadic’s aspiration of Serbian membership in the EU 
come to fruition, the move would mark a significant shift in Belgrade away from 
Russia and toward Moscow’s European rivals. Moreover, Tadic’s aims represent 
a serious threat to Russia’s attempts to prevent Kosovar independence. 
Immediately following the election, Kosovo’s Prime Minister, Hashim Thaci, 
stated that Kosovo would “declare independence this month.” (6) This bold 
statement, combined with Tadic’s refusal to compromise Serbia’s improving 
relations with the EU for the sake of retaining Kosovo, as well as international 
support for Kosovar independence, suggests that the intensive Russian 
campaign to forestall a declaration from Pristina faces imminent defeat. Should 
Prime Minister Thaci’s prediction of Kosovar independence by March materialize, 
it would mark a significant blow for Russia’s assertive foreign policy at the end of 
Putin’s time in the Presidential office. 
 
While the Serbian election attracted attention from all sides of the ongoing 
Kosovo dispute, one of Russia’s smallest neighbors, Estonia, demonstrated 
renewed opposition to perceived Russian meddling in its affairs. In a move that 
took many of its targets by surprise, Estonia sought to exact a measure of 
revenge against the Kremlin-backed Russian youth organization Nashi by 
blacklisting over 2000 of its members from entering Estonia in retaliation for the 
group’s participation in anti-Estonian protests in 2007, as well as alleged 
participation by some of its members in the rioting that swept the Baltic state last 
April. Due to Estonia’s participation in the Schengen Agreement, the blacklisted 
youth activists also have found themselves forbidden from entering any part of 
the European Union. (7) This surprising action is only one of several recent 
indications of Estonia’s refusal to forget the support lent by Moscow to ethnic 
Russian rioters in Tallinn and Narva last year, after the removal of a prominent 
WWII memorial in Estonia’s capital city. Last month, Estonia began the highly 
publicized trial of four ethnic Russian youth activists, including the leader of 
Nashi’s Estonian chapter, charged with incitement during last year’s riots. 
Prosecutors asserted that the accused organizers planned the rioting well in 
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advance of the monument’s removal and that their illegal activities had the 
financial support of the Russian government, an allegation the Kremlin has 
denied. (8) In addition, Estonian courts fined an ethnic Russian over 1,500 
dollars for launching a denial-of-service attack against the website of Prime 
Minister Andrus Ansip’s political party during the rioting. (9) The clearly 
deteriorating relationship between Russia and Estonia bodes poorly for Russian-
EU relations on the whole, for, as the anti-Nashi blacklist demonstrates, the 
Baltic state’s entry into the European Union has granted it a voice in wider 
European affairs, which adds another dimension to Russia’s historically poor 
relations with the former Soviet republic.  Most importantly, however, Estonia 
also recently used its standing as a new member of NATO to present Russian 
policymakers with a new hurdle. While on an official visit to Georgia, Estonian 
Prime Minister Ansip vowed to continue his efforts to convince Estonia’s NATO 
partners to accept Georgia into their ranks. (10) Such a move certainly would 
exacerbate Moscow’s already strained relations with Georgia and could 
undermine Russia’s relationship with the NATO alliance as a whole. 
 
Russia pledges to coordinate policy with Belarus 
As Russia’s relations with Serbia and Estonia falter, the Kremlin continues to 
draw ever closer with its Belarusian allies.  During a visit to Minsk on January 30, 
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov and his Belarusian counterpart Sergei Martynov 
unveiled a new plan to coordinate their countries’ foreign policy programs, with 
the goal of ensuring, “maximum favorable external conditions for the economic 
and social welfare and security of citizens of our states.” (11) In addition, Lavrov 
promised to help Belarus combat sanctions and other “short sighted” restrictions 
placed upon it by the international community. (12) Lastly, Russia’s ambassador 
to Belarus promised his host country that Russia would not significantly increase 
the price Belarus must pay for Russian natural gas in the near future. (13) 
 
Source Notes: 
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Russian Federation: Energy Politics 
By Creelea Henderson 
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Medvedev questions pipeline delays in the Far East 
First Deputy Prime Minister and heir apparent to the Russian presidency, Dmitri 
Medvedev, temporarily stepped out of his tertiary role as Chairman of the Board 
of Directors of Gazprom earlier this month to admonish executives from both 
Rosneft and Gazprom to set aside their differences and get to work on a pipeline 
that will supply Russian consumers in the Far East with long-awaited volumes of 
blue fuel. (1) Medvedev was in the eastern city of Khabarovsk to address chronic 
delays holding up construction of a gas pipeline that will link Sakhalin Island to 
Vladivostok. The stymied project represents a lack of coordination between the 
state behemoths Gazprom and Rosneft and highlights the difficulties in the 
implementation of Russia’s gasification program, the state strategy to provide 
socioeconomic stimulus to the regions through the infusion of natural gas 
volumes. 
 
The Sakhalin-Vladivostok gas line is one branch in a proposed complex of 
pipelines that will travel southward through the Primorsk region. While plans for 
the pipeline originally envisaged delivery to domestic markets in Khabarovsk and 
Vladivostok, a second, parallel arm was proposed to transport volumes of gas 
from the Sakhalin-1 project to neighboring China. (2) This proposal, put forward 
by Exxon Naftegas in 2006, was the result of an agreement signed between 
Exxon Mobil and China National Petroleum Corporation to build a pipeline with 
an annual capacity of 8 billion cubic meters of gas destined for the Chinese 
market. (3) With a 20 percent stake in the Sakhalin-1 project, Rosneft also was 
attracted by the potential profit flowing from foreign sales. No sooner was the 
plan announced, however, than it was scuttled by Gazprom officials keen to 
maintain the company’s monopoly over gas exports. 
 
In 2007, Gazprom succeeded in persuading Exxon Naftegas to direct gas 
volumes extracted from Sakhalin-1 to domestic markets in Russia’s Far East, in 
cooperation with the country’s regional gasification campaign. (4) To that end, 
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Gazprom arranged the purchase of the entire gas production of Sakhalin-1 at 
artificially depressed rates. “The people involved in Sakhalin-1 are very well 
aware of the price range in the Russian Far East,” said Aleksandr Medvedev, 
Deputy Chairman of Gazprom. “I believe that this price level would be a good 
basis for our negotiation.” (5) 
 
Now it appears that Gazprom, too, has its eye on the lucrative export route to 
China. In April of last year, Gazprom Deputy CEO Aleksandr Ananenkov 
indicated that the company plans to acquire both the domestic and export-
oriented Sakhalin-Vladivostok pipeline network controlled by Rosneft-
Sakhalinmorneftegaz. (6) At present, the pipeline extends only as far as 
Komsomolsk-on-Amur and operates at less than half of its capacity for 4.5 billion 
cubic meters of gas annually. “It hasn’t been fully completed while the section 
between Sakhalin and Komsomolsk-on-Amur is in an extremely bad technical 
condition. It is an old system and it belongs to Rosneft,” Ananenkov said, laying 
blame for the incomplete pipeline squarely upon Gazprom’s rival. (7) 
 
Speaking with Dmitri Medvedev this month in Khabarovsk, Ananenkov declared 
that Gazprom is prepared to complete the pipeline complex that will supply 
Primorsky residents with gas, should the company be allowed to take charge of 
the project. “We handed our proposals to Rosneft and other participants in the 
project supported us,” Ananenkov said. “Gazprom must join the project to build a 
system from Sakhalin to Komsomolsk and to bring it eventually to the design 
throughput of 4.5 billion cubic meters. Then we’ll extend the system by another 
900 kilometers from Khabarovsk to Vladivostok so that people in that city could 
get gas as of 2011,” he said. (8) As matters stand, the project remains 
deadlocked with Gazprom and Rosneft unwilling to meet the other’s terms. 
 
The pipeline debacle puts Dmitri Medvedev in a delicate situation. In his new 
capacity as Putin’s successor, it is incumbent upon the chairman of Gazprom to 
rise above parochial loyalties owed to his company and to advance the cause of 
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domestic development, at least in the run up to March elections. As first deputy 
prime minister of the Russian Federation and presidential candidate, Medvedev 
issued what he called “strict instructions” to Gazprom and Rosneft: to bring the 
pipeline development process to an expedient close. “Let’s conclude 
negotiations, come to a commercial agreement and build,” he said. (9) 
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Elections loom large  
Armenia is preparing for presidential elections on February 19, and the electorate 
is evaluating the unexpected reappearance of former President Levon Ter-
Petrosian. The official campaign season began on 21 January. The contest has 
nine candidates: the head of the Republican Party of Armenia and designated 
favorite of President Robert Kocharian, Prime Minister Serzh Sarkisian; Orinats 
Yerkir party leader Artur Baghdasarian; former president of Armenia Levon Ter-
Petrosian; Vice-Speaker of parliament and leader of the Dashnaktsutyun party 
Vaan Ovanissian; former prime minister and chief of the opposition National 
Democratic Union Vazgen Manukian;  People's Party leader Tigran Karapetian; 
the head of the National Unity party Artashes Gegamian; National Accord leader 
Aram Arutyunian; and  former Nagorno Karabakh presidential adviser Arman 
Melikian. (1) About 280 OSCE observers and 30 PACE observers are scheduled 
to monitor the elections. (2) 
 
The definitive front runner in the election is Serzh Sarkisian. Sarkisian is backed, 
not surprisingly, by the parties of power, the Republican Party, and the 
Prosperous Armenia party. (3) The Republican Party and Prosperous Armenia 
are both pro-presidential parties that have cooperated to maintain a majority in 
parliament. Ter-Petrosian, on the other hand, has received support in his surprise 
resurgence from a variety of actors, including the Armenian National Movement 
Party, Stepan Demirchian from the People's Party, and the leader of the 
opposition Republic Party, Aram Sarkisian. (4) Additionally, Ter-Petrosian’s 
campaign team includes many former government officials. His election 
campaign is being run by former Foreign Minister Aleksandr Arzoumanian, while 
former Interior Minister Suren Abrahamian is helping to run one of the Yerevan 
district offices. (5)  
 
The campaign has been relatively sedate, although there have been several 
protests in the lead-up to the election as well as during the campaign period. In 
November, almost 12,000 people gathered at a protest sponsored by former 
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Armenian president and current opposition candidate Levon Ter-Petrosian. (6) 
More recently, on 3 February, thousands rallied in Yerevan in support of 
presidential candidate and Orinats Yerkir party leader Artur Baghdasarian. (7) 
 
Media coverage prior to the campaign seemed slanted in Sarkisian’s favor. He 
received abundant coverage largely in his official capacity as prime minister. (8) 
There were also reports of pressure and attacks on media outlets supporting Ter-
Petrosian. In December, a pro-Ter-Petrosian newspaper, the Chorrord 
Ishkhanutyun, was the target of a planted explosive in the early hours of the 
morning. The paper’s editor, Shogher Matevosian, claimed the attack was the 
result of the paper’s support for the former president. (9) 
 
Also in December, the Gyumri-based television station Gala came under 
pressure after airing favorable coverage of Ter-Petrosian earlier in the fall. Vahan 
Khachatrian, the station’s owner, said that the municipal authorities suddenly 
claimed ownership of the broadcasting tower that Gala has been using, citing the 
need to privatize it. When he offered to pay a reasonable price, the authorities 
informed him that they would accept a price five to six times the normal cost of a 
tower and also would charge him an exorbitant fee for previous use of the tower. 
Khachatrian insists that the issue of the broadcasting tower has come to the fore 
only because his station has covered Ter-Petrosian in an objective way. (10) 
 
During the election period, Ter-Petrosian has refused to appear on several 
political television programs during the campaign, claiming that the questions he 
would have been asked would have been prepared specifically by Kocharian’s 
administration with the aim of discrediting him. (11) 
 
Opposition parties have complained of violations in the electoral process. For 
instance, although the campaign officially began on 21 January, a group called 
the United Liberal National Party began campaigning on Sarkisian’s behalf at 
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least 12 days before the campaign’s official start, with no reaction coming from 
the authorities. (12) 
 
Ter-Petrosian’s campaign headquarters has appealed to the Central Electoral 
Commission (CEC) to cancel Sarkisian’s registration as a presidential candidate 
on the grounds that he is spending funds on his campaign from sources outside 
of his election fund. (13) The spokesman of Ter-Petrosian’s central election 
headquarters, Arman Musinyan, also stated that the opposition will bring a suit 
against the CEC if they fail to act on the complaint. (14) 
 
Artur Baghdasarian, the distant second place candidate according to some polls, 
has alleged that a process of bribery has started in the lead-up to the elections. 
The Prosecutor-General has requested that Baghdasarian present evidence of 
his claims. (15) 
 
As things now stand, the presidency seems likely to go to Sarkisian. A poll 
conducted by the Sociometer survey organization on 1 February showed Serzh 
Sarkisian leading the polls, with 67% of participants saying they would vote in his 
favor. Trailing far behind him were Artur Baghdasarian (9%), Levon Ter-
Petrosian (6%), Vaan Ovanissian (3%), Artashes Gegamian (2%) and Vazgen 
Manukian (1.5%). The remaining candidates received virtually zero support. (16) 
 
According to a different survey conducted by a British polling organization, 
Populus, and published on state-owned Armenian TV, 50.7% of those polled 
would vote for Prime Minister Sarkisian, with Artur Baghdasaryan receiving 
13.4% and Levon Ter-Petrosian culling 12.6%. None of the other presidential 
candidates garnered more than 8%, according to the poll results. With regard to 
other issues, including the economy, resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh’s status, 
international recognition of the Armenian genocide, and national security, 
Sarkisian consistently earned at least 20 percentage points more than his closest 
competition. (17) 
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In early February, with more than two weeks remaining in the campaign period, 
there had seemed to be a chance that several of the opposition candidates could 
unite and potentially force Sarkisian to a run-off. Talks were reported to be 
underway between Ter-Petrosian, Orinats Yerkir party candidate Artur 
Baghdasaryan, and Raffi Ovannesian, (18) the leader of the Heritage party who 
was barred from competing in the election because the police refused to confirm 
that he had held Armenian citizenship for at least ten years. (19) Baghdasaryan 
and Ovannesian were rumored to be considering giving their support to Ter-
Petrosian as an opposition candidate. However, the 9 February deadline for 
withdrawal has since passed with all nine of the candidates remaining in the 
race, thus dividing the opposition vote and strengthening Sarkisian’s candidacy. 
 
In a desperate attempt to forestall the elections, Ter-Petrosian appealed to the 
Constitutional Court to rule that he was confronted with “insurmountable 
obstacles” to his campaign in the form of biased news coverage. A favorable 
ruling would delay the vote for two weeks, thus giving Ter-Petrosian a longer time 
to campaign. The Constitutional Court denied the erstwhile president’s appeal, 
thus solidifying Sarkisian’s prospects as Kocharian’s successor. (20) 
 
Source Notes: 
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Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
Uzbek president signs away aircraft, natural gas production to Russia 
Islom Karimov arrived in Moscow on February 5 for his first meeting with 
President Vladimir Putin since winning reelection to his third term as 
Uzbekistan’s president in December.  The meeting is reported to have been 
arranged rather hastily, following US Central Command Admiral William Fallon’s 
trip to Tashkent in late January. (1)  During his one-day visit, Admiral Fallon met 
with President Karimov, as well as with other senior government officials, in order 
to discuss issues such as regional security and operations in Afghanistan. (2)  A 
number of experts on the region view the Admiral’s visit as a clear attempt to 
improve US relations with Uzbekistan and see Karimov’s subsequent visit to 
Moscow as a move to allay Putin’s suspicions that the Admiral’s overtures might 
have been too well received. (3)  Admiral Fallon’s Central Asia trip included 
Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan, concluding in Tashkent. (4) 
 
Aside from the usual surfeit of mutually complimentary rhetoric and general 
bonhomie, Karimov’s sojourn to Moscow bore only two concrete results.  The first 
is an agreement between Lukoil Overseas (wholly owned subsidiary of Lukoil) 
and SoyuzNefteGaz to cede Lukoil controlling shares in the group of companies, 
which includes SoyuzNefteGaz Vostok Limited.  SoyuzNefteGaz Vostok Ltd. is 
one of the signatories to the Production Sharing Agreement (PSA) for the natural 
gas fields in Uzbekistan’s Southwest Hissar and Ustyurt Regions.  The PSA 
includes eight fields which contain C1 reserves (C1 reserves are those reserves 
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estimated by drilling and individual tests) of 100 billion cubic meters, according to 
a Lukoil press release.  Development of these eight fields will require an 
investment of more than US$700 million and the resulting flow of natural gas is to 
be exported through the Gazprom pipeline network. (5)  Uzbekistan and the other 
Central Asian republics, certainly are in need of foreign investment in order to 
develop their energy resources and the Russian government clearly has an 
interest in gaining control of Central Asia’s energy industry, especially in light of 
China’s recent aggressive tactics to secure sufficient oil and gas resources to 
fuel its own rapidly expanding economy.  However, the Russian government has 
been known to fall short in its investment promises to Central Asian countries, 
including in Lukoil’s and Gazprom’s contracts with Uzbekneftegaz. (6)  President 
Karimov’s esteem for Russia’s oil and gas giants must have experienced a 
considerable leap upward for him to grant what easily could become a Russian 
monopoly over the Southwest Hissar and Ustyurt gas fields to Lukoil.  Perhaps 
now that Karimov has renewed his family’s stranglehold on power (his daughter 
Gulnara heads a business empire in Uzbekistan that includes sections of the oil 
and gas industry), he has decided to plumb the depths of his country’s energy 
wealth a little more deeply, with help from a company amenable to his needs. 
 
The second result of the Uzbek president’s trip to Moscow is the finalization of 
Russia's United Aircraft Corporation (UAC) takeover of the Chkalov Aircraft 
Production Enterprise, (7) which is located on the outskirts of Tashkent and when 
in full production employs at least 30,000 people.  The Chkalov plant is one of 
the largest aircraft assembly facilities in Central Asia and one of Uzbekistan’s 
biggest employers. (8)  The plant apparently has not been doing well financially 
and has relied mainly on government subsidies to stay afloat.  Its export sales 
have declined dramatically and it is heavily in debt, (9) prompting Uzbekistan’s 
cabinet of ministers to issue a resolution last August ordering a 20% reduction in 
the plant’s workforce by the end of 2007, most likely in preparation for its 
takeover by Russia’s UAC. (10)  Now under UAC’s auspices, the Chkalov plant 
will undergo an audit by accountants from Ernst, Young, Deloitte and Touche, as 
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part of a “restructuring process,” which is expected to be completed by the end of 
this year, according to UAC chief Alexei Fyodorov. (11)  The Chkalov facility 
currently assembles Il-76 transport planes and Il-114 passenger planes. (12)  
Even in its economically ailing state, the plant supplies a very significant number 
of employment opportunities and should its workforce be drastically reduced or 
should UAC decide to strip the plant of its equipment and then relocate 
production to Ulyanovsk, as former Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Fradkov 
threatened might happen last March, it would cause a sharp rise in Tashkent’s 
unemployment rate. (13)  Given the precarious state of Uzbekistan’s economy 
and the government’s inability to provide much in the way of social services for 
the unemployed, allowing UAC to shut down one of the country’s largest job-
providers seems inadvisable.  The real question, however, is why any Russian 
company would agree to take on an enterprise in Uzbekistan, which is so heavily 
in debt, unless the deal with UAC was an unofficial part of the agreement with 
Lukoil – one of Russia’s state energy companies is granted a sizeable chunk of 
Uzbekistan’s natural gas assets in return for taking a financial sinkhole (the 
Chkalov plant) off Karimov’s hands.  Even the local powers-that-be in Tashkent 
may be indifferent to the plant’s eventual fate, if their pockets also were lined as 
part of the deal. 
 
Admiral Fallon’s visit, however well met it may have been, seems to have been of 
little consequence for US-Uzbek relations, at least in the short term. But, deals 
such as the ones President Karimov struck in Moscow usually are long in the 
making and in fact, the Uzbek president only signed off on contracts for which 
negotiations started at least one year ago.  Furthermore, if one of Karimov’s 
primary concerns continues to be the growth of his family’s business empire, 
even when at the expense of Uzbekistan’s economic stability, then Russian 
companies undoubtedly will prove to be far more amiable partners than Western 
businesses, which tend to be constrained by stricter laws and regulations 
regarding ethical business practices. 
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Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Ukraine’s gas woes underscore domestic power struggle  
On 12 February the international press heralded a “solution” to the latest dispute 
between Russia and Ukraine over the latter’s gas debt.  (1)   Ukraine’s politicians 
publicly celebrated, too.  Prime Minister Yulia Tymoshenko termed the 
“agreement” made between Russia President Vladimir Putin and Ukraine 
President Viktor Yushchenko a “victory of the democratic team.”  In particular, 
Tymoshenko stressed that both sides had agreed to pursue “the elimination of all 
mediators from the gas market of Ukraine, including the shadows and 
corruption.” (2)    
 
However, it is likely that this celebration is just a bit premature.  A close 
examination of the situation shows that, with two major exceptions, the 
“agreement” actually contained only outlines for future discussions.    
 
The exceptions are important.  In a clear negotiating maneuver, Gazprom figured 
the cost of gas used (and not paid for) in the final quarter of 2007 at the 2008 
price of $179 per 1000 cubic meters instead of the 2007 price of $130 per 1000 
cubic meters.  Putin and Yushchenko finally agreed that the price would be $130 
per 1000 cubic meters, which will, according to Yushchenko, lower the debt by 
over $150 million.  (3)  
 
Gazprom also agreed to remove the controversial gas broker RosUkrEnergo 
from the gas distribution process.  The way in which this will be done, however, 
and the long term implications for Ukraine were left to others to decide.  Since 
this constitutes the thorniest issue in the gas debate, it is very possible that within 
just a few short weeks, a new dispute will emerge.  This is particularly true since 
there is deep disagreement within Ukraine about how to deal with the situation, 
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and since Gazprom has been unclear about whether or not it will accept removal 
of gas intermediaries altogether. 
 
Yushchenko, Tymoshenko and RosUkrEnergo  
Although the situation is often portrayed simply as a dispute between Russia and 
Ukraine, in reality this dynamic is just one part of the equation.  Ukraine’s gas 
trade is fully immersed in a power struggle between President Yushchenko and 
Prime Minister Tymoshenko, and to a lesser extent, between Russian politicians 
vying for control as President Vladimir Putin’s presidential term ends. The 
internal Ukrainian power struggle informs every word and every action taken 
around the issue of gas. 
 
The main disagreement, and the underlying cause of Ukraine’s dispute with 
Russia, deals with the use of RosUkrEnergo (RUE) to control the gas trade 
between the two countries.  RUE was created in 2004 by then-President Leonid 
Kuchma simply as a tool to negotiate a gas deal between Ukraine and Central 
Asia.  In the last two years, it has taken full control over all gas transactions for 
Ukraine. 
 
Its work has been profitable.   RUE reported earnings of around $800 million from 
its work as an intermediary during 2006. (4)  Several energy analysts claim that 
some 45% of that figure went to a Ukrainian businessman who was found last 
year to be a major holder of RosUkrEnergo, through his own company.  Another 
Ukrainian businessman is said to own a significant portion of RUE, also through 
the same company, while Gazprom owns 50%.  The precise figure’s are difficult 
to confirm at this point. 
 
As of 13 February, earnings for 2007 do not appear on the company’s website. 
 
The company reportedly has received a percentage of its profits by re-
exporting—at a price of over $300 per 1000 cubic meters—a portion of the 
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Central Asian gas that was imported at only $179 per 1000 cubic meters.   Most 
of these exports were to Poland or Hungary.  
 
This arrangement with RUE removes the Ukrainian government entirely from 
oversight over gas imports, while creating a windfall for a very select few.  
Furthermore, while cutting out the Ukrainian government, it simultaneously allows 
Russian state-owned Gazprom significant input over Ukraine’s gas policy by 
virtue of the company’s 50% ownership of RUE.  
 
As noted in the previous ISCIP Analyst, President Yushchenko has publicly 
waffled between calling for all intermediaries to be removed from the process and 
supporting the work done by RosUkrEnergo.  In recent weeks, Yushchenko has 
increased his praise for the company’s work in securing what he has described 
as the lowest gas price in Europe.  “The price we have today, of 179 dollars per 
1000 cubic meters, is the lowest price on the whole perimeter from the Baltic to 
the Caucasus,” he said on 20 January.   “This is good.” (5)  
 
Prime Minister Tymoshenko, meanwhile, has urged that RosUkrEnergo be 
immediately discharged from its intermediary duties, calling it a corrupt structure 
and suggesting that the fees and profits the company receives are a hidden 
additional tax that must be included in the cost of Ukraine’s gas.  “It is a front 
company, an artificially created company, so that gas coming to Ukraine comes 
through a filter that will catch a significant amount of money,” she told the New 
York Times in 2006. (6)  
 
This disagreement between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko has the potential to 
undermine any deal with Gazprom.  Any gas contract involving Naftohaz 
technically must be approved not by the head of state, Yushchenko, but by the 
head of government, Tymoshenko.  At the same time, as head of the National 
Security and Defense Council, and as the leader of one bloc in Tymoshenko’s 
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parliamentary majority, Yushchenko can torpedo any deal made by his Prime 
Minister. 
 
That was then…  
Questions abound regarding how RosUkrEnergo was created and who was 
involved.  Ukraine’s media carries continual speculation, with the only certainty 
being that the decisions were made quietly outside the view of the public.   These 
questions long have caused tensions between Ukraine’s two leaders.  
 
During Tymoshenko’s first premiership in 2005, she began investigating whether 
Ukrainian politicians had received a portion of RUE’s windfall in exchange for 
supporting the deal that created the company.  Former Minister for Fuel and 
Energy Yuriy Boyko was found to have been listed as a member of 
RosUkrEnergo’s founding Coordinating Council and, according to former Security 
Services head Oleksandr Turchynov, was questioned at length twice about his 
connection to the company.  Officials also questioned Ihor Voronin, former 
deputy head of Naftohaz, for his appearance on the Coordinating Council.  (7) 
 
Turchynov, who has been one of Tymoshenko’s closest allies for more than 15 
years, hinted to RFE/RL in 2006 that his investigation of RosUkrEnergo 
contributed to the decision by Yushchenko to dismiss the Tymoshenko 
government in September of 2005.  Yushchenko has denied this vehemently, 
citing other reasons for the dismissal, including what he called unsatisfactory 
work overseeing the economy. 
 
Turchynov suggested that, in mid-August, Yushchenko ordered him to stop 
“persecuting my men,” and complained that his investigation was causing 
tensions between him and President Putin.  Turchynov claimed that investigators 
uncovered evidence of kickbacks to former government officials.  He has never 
publicly produced such evidence and no officials have been charged.  The 
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investigator working on the case was transferred to other matters, following 
Turchynov’s sudden removal.  (8) 
 
During the acrimonious 2006 parliamentary campaign, which saw the blocs of 
Tymoshenko and Yushchenko running separately, Tymoshenko suggested that 
Yushchenko had ordered her away from the gas industry.  “There were written 
documents which contained certain restrictions for the government when the gas 
matters were concerned,” she told Ukrayinska Pravda.  “He said ‘I am going to 
deal with these issues myself, there is no need for the Prime Minister to get 
involved,’” she continued.   She did not aggressively protest at that time, 
Tymoshenko said, but suggested that she was bothered by the order.  “I thought: 
RosUkrEnergo has got itself a new ‘roof’ now.” (9) 
 
Since then, Yushchenko and Tymoshenko have reconciled and Tymoshenko 
shies away from direct criticism of the president.  She has gone to great lengths 
to underscore that she does not believe gas corruption has touched Yushchenko 
himself. 
 
Nevertheless, these accusations have led to constant undercurrents of suspicion 
regarding Yushchenko’s connection to RosUkrEnergo’s beneficiaries, although 
there has never been any evidence—direct or indirect—that the president is 
benefiting from RosUkrEnergo’s existence.    
 
Just one week ago, Yushchenko responded with irritation when questioned about 
the situation by a reporter on a live interview program: 
 
“I find it unpleasant to talk about gas. I don’t feel like talking about this damn 
subject because I realize that it…it puts me in a tight spot. I get tied to the 
allegation that my family is involved in gas trade. Thank God Almighty, I’m 
occupied with something more interesting — and so is my family — than gas.” 
(10) 
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In fact, many observers of the president suggest that his primary motivation is 
that he prefers to avoid confrontation;  he views any disagreement over 
RosUkrEnergo as unnecessary and potentially destabilizing to the economy.  
 
The President also has expressed suspicion of Tymoshenko, implying that she 
would like to gain control of the gas income for her allies.  She vehemently 
denies these suggestions. 
 
For her part, the Prime Minister never has avoided confrontation, seeing it as 
necessary to implement significant reform.  She has called corruption in the 
energy market a “cancer” on Ukraine, and is said to view RosUkrEnergo as the 
country’s greatest example of this “cancer.”  
 
Nevertheless, almost immediately after Tymoshenko’s dismissal in 2005, her 
replacement, Yushchenko ally Yuriy Yekhanurov, began negotiating a new 
agreement with Gazprom through RosUkrEnergo.  For reasons never fully 
explained, in the new agreement, RosUkrEnergo, Gazprom and Ukraine’s 
Naftohaz created yet another intermediary structure for distribution of gas within 
Ukraine.  
 
Previously, RUE could import gas only for distribution by Naftohaz.  The new 
UkrGasEnergo effectively took over most of the work of the state-owned 
Naftohaz, distributing gas to industrial customers and collecting money and fees 
for doing so.  UkrGasEnergo is owned 50% each by RosUkrEnergo and 
Naftohaz.  In the agreement that created the concern, Naftohaz was granted the 
right to distribute gas to residential consumers, who represent the least lucrative 
gas market in the country.  In essence, Naftohaz de facto was privatized.    
 
Then in opposition, Tymoshenko launched a campaign against the continued use 
of RosUkrEnergo and against the creation of UkrGasEnergo.   Speaking on 
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ICTV’s “Freedom of Speech” debate program, she warned that the effect of 
allowing UkrGazEnergo to distribute gas in Ukraine could be “bankruptcy and the 
loss of our state company [Naftohaz].” (11) These worries were dismissed by the 
government.  
 
Privately, a number of energy analysts wondered if perhaps Naftohaz 
intentionally was being pushed to bankruptcy.  Such a bankruptcy would allow 
those in power to make a case for full legal privatization of the entity, which could 
lead to UkrGazEnergo and RosUkrEnergo taking over all distribution of gas in 
Ukraine, and potentially management of the country’s pipeline system.  Ukraine’s 
largest asset would be neutralized.  
 
… and this is now 
 Upon entering office in late December 2007, Tymoshenko’s Cabinet discovered 
that Naftohaz had neglected to pay RosUkrEnergo for gas it distributed to 
residential customers. (12)  At the time, according to those close to the situation, 
Naftohaz even was unable to articulate what it had paid and what it hadn’t.  No 
money appeared on its accounts.  After an examination of various accounts, the 
government confirmed a debt for gas as of 1 January 2008, totaling 
approximately $1.04 billion.  
 
In a 31 January 2008 letter to RosUkrEnergo, copied to Gazprom, Naftohaz 
formally acknowledged the discovery of the $1.04 billion debt for 2007.   In its 
note, newly appointed Naftohaz deputy head Ihor Didenko suggested that the 
company is in negotiations with Deutsche Bank for a loan, and that full payment 
of the 2007 debt should be complete within 6-8 weeks.  (13) 
 
It is unclear whether there was any official written response to this letter, but one 
week later, Gazprom’s Sergey Kupriyanov threatened to “cut supplies of Russian 
gas to Ukraine.” (14)  Kupriyanov suggested that the debt had “ballooned” to $1.5 
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billion.  Ukraine immediately rejected the figure, largely because it included the 
cost of Russian gas instead of only gas from Central Asia. 
 
Because Central Asia could not meet its designated gas volumes to Ukraine in 
late 2007 and so far this year, RUE chose to make up the difference with far 
more expensive Russian gas, for which it is charging not $179 per 1000 cubic 
meters, but $314.  (15)  
 
The Ukrainian government apparently was not consulted about the inclusion of 
Russian gas at the new price, and there appears to be no way for the 
government to verify where its gas originated, since it is “mixed” by 
RosUkrEnergo at the border.  On 11 February, Tymoshenko said Ukraine “will 
not accept from RosUkrEnergo any gas other than Central Asian gas.”  (16) At 
the same time, the Prime Minister suggested that Ukraine’s debt had increased 
to $1.072 billion as of that day – calculated using the $179 figure.  (17) 
 
For his part, Yushchenko has kept his comments general.  He has released no 
statement on the possibility of removing RosUkrEnergo, although Gazprom’s 
Aleksei Miller suggested that it had been agreed upon during a meeting between 
Putin and Yushchenko.  The Ukrainian president also has given no opinion on 
the size of the debt, instead suggesting that a working group would be formed to 
examine the issue.  
 
The issue of a schedule for debt payment and how to solve the issue of 
RosUkrEnergo will now be the subject of negotiations including representatives 
Naftohaz and Gazprom.  Gazprom continues to insist that Ukraine owes over 
$1.5 billion, while Ukraine insists that it owes under $1.1 billion.  
 
Additionally, on 13 February, one day after announcing the agreement, Miller 
rejected Tymoshenko’s calls for a removal of all intermediaries.  “If they want 
Central Asian gas,” he said, “it would be necessary to leave an intermediary.” 
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(18)  He did not explain why, but it is clear that Russia intends to keep some sort 
of private entity involved in the process.  At their meeting, Putin and Yushchenko 
agreed to replace RosUkrEnergo with a new company owned equally by 
Gazprom and Naftohaz – in other words, a new gas intermediary.  
 
Those monitoring the creation of RosUkrEnergo in 2004 will remember that this 
company also was designed originally to represent Gazprom and Naftohaz 
equally;  somehow, though, Ukraine’s interests were put in the hands of private 
businessmen who profited handsomely at Ukraine’s expense.  Could this happen 
again?   
 
Those same observers also will remember that RosUkrEnergo replaced another 
discredited intermediary that had, in turn, replaced yet another.  Is it possible, 
then, to create a gas broker that could serve the interests of both Russia and 
Ukraine? To do so, agreement must be achieved not only between Russia and 
Ukraine, but also between Ukraine’s leaders.  Given the history of all concerned, 
that may be too much to ask.  
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